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The Buddhist Concept of an Omniscient Being 
一一-History of the Sarvajna Study and Its Significance-一一1
ShinjδKAWASAKI 
The present author has spent his years in studying the Buddhist concept of 
Sarvajna， tracing its historical development in the old lndian texts， in the Tibetan 
translation of the Sanskrit texts， and the later literatl.1re composed by the native 
Tibetans， in the Chinese Buddhist sources， and in the living tradition of Japanese 
Buddhism， analyzing its nature and content， and examining the significance that this 
concept of an omniscient being has in the history of hl.1man thought. He published the 
result of his nvestigation in book form in J apanese: Issaichi Shisi5 no Keηkyu.2 
Being conscious of our own human limitations， when we have some one， some 
person or some thing， on which we would rely in every aspect of our judgments， we 
expect that person or that thing to be far beyond us in power and ability. We expect 
that he or that one to be always right and perfect， that he or it should be always 
infallible， viz. ， be itself all-knowing and giving us exact and perfect knowledge about 
al other things and matters. He may be a god， or may be the fOl.1nding father of Ol.1r 
creed. In the modern world， itis possible that the position of that perfect one might be 
replaced by a computer machine， or in an occult creed， that one may be a crystal ball 
that could tel everything. Whatever form it may take， the general concept of omni-
science is prominent in every system of the hl.1man thoughts. In the case of Buddhists， 
it is Sakyamuni the Buddha， their Founding Father， who is this perfect one. ¥iVhat they， 
or rather， we， as the present speaker himself a Buddhist， mean by the word "Buddha" 
produces another complicated issue. Anyhow， from the earliest stage of the history of 
Buddhism， the Buddha was acknowledged as the perfect one， the omniscient being 
1 The original draft of the present paper was read by Shinjo Kawasaki at the Oriental Institute， 
Oxford University， asan introduction to the series of his lectures entitled:“The Buddhist Concept 
of an Omniscient Being (sarvajna)" of the Numata Visiting Lectureship. The topics and the dates 
of the whole series of the lectures actually given are as follows: 
Lecture 1 (April 24， 195): Introduction: Outlines of a Study of the Buddhist Concept of an 
Omniscient Being (sarvajna)--History and Significance of the Study-一一
Lecture 2 (May 1， 195): The Omniscient Being in the Brahmanic Sources--"One Who Knows 
This Whole" in the Upanisads and “the All-knowing One" in the Yoga-sulra-一一
Lecture 3 (May 8， 195): Sabbannu in Pali Literature--Omniscience and Attainment of 
Buddhahood; Buddhist References to the Omniscience of Mahavira-一
Lecture 4 (May15， 195): The Omniscient Being in Abhidharma Literature--Instant Knowl-
edge of All according to the Mahasamghikas; Emergence from lmmaculate Nescience of an 
Arhat--
Lecture 5 (May 22，195): The Omniscient Being in Two Mahayana Sastras: the Ta-chih-ta-lun 
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(sabbannu， sabbavidu， or sarvajna) and was proclaimed as such by his followers. Their 
claim， however， met with a series of severe criticisms from the holders of religious 
tenets other than Buddhism. Even among the Buddhists themselves， the differences in 
the ideas and theories on the Buddha's nature and the Buddha's personality， or the 
differences in their epistemological theories have produced various standpoints and 
respectively unique interpretations of the omniscience of the Buddha. 
The Buddha's Encounter with Ajivika Upaka 
The first naive presentation of doubt about the Buddha's omniscience was made 
by an Ajivika， Upaka， who met with the Buddha on the latter's way to Varanasi to 
meet his former five co-mendicant friends to preach the Dhamma. An early Buddhist 
Sutta kept in the MaJihima-N佐々 αtellsus in the words of the Buddha in the following 
way: 
“Then， monks， Upaka， a N aked Ascetic， saw me as 1 was going along the high 
road between Gaya and the (Tree of) Awakening; having seen me， he spoke thus: 
‘Your reverence， your faculties are quite pure， your complexion is very bright， very 
c1ear. On account of whom have you， your reverence， gone forth， or who is your 
teacher， or whose Dhamma do you profess?' When this had been said， 1， monks， 
addressed Upaka， the N aked Ascetic， inverses: 
Victorious over a1 (sabbabhibhu)， omniscient am 1 (sabbavidu 'ham asmi)， 
Among a1 things undefiled (sabbesu dhammesu anupalitto)， 
Leaving a1 (sabbanjaho)， 
through death of craving freed (tanhakkhaye vimutto)， 
By knowing for myself whom should 1 point to 
(sayam abhinnaya kam 'iddiseyyam)? 
For me there is no teacher， 
One like me does not exist， 
(Mahaprajnaparamita-upadesa-sas!ra) & the Shih-chu-p'i-p'o-shαlun (Dαsa-bhumi -vibhasa-
sa.stra)-一一TenBad Karmans of the Buddha's Former Lives-一一
Lecture 6 (May 29， 1995): The Mimamsakas and the Buddhist Logicians on Omniscience--; 
The Omniscient Being according to Buddhist Logicians: Dignaga and Dharmakirti; Refuta-
tion of the Buddha's Omniscience by Mimamsaka Kumarila; Discussions on the Omniscient 
Being in the Last Chapter of the Tatfvasamgrahαof Santaraksita-一一
Lecture 7 (June 5， 1995): The Omniscient Being in Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-karika and the 
Tarkajvala一一一theObstruction of Cognizable Things (jneya -avarana); Discrepancies in the 
Sanskrit and the Tibetan Texts of the .Madhyamaka-hrdaya-一一一
Lecture 8 (]une 12， 1995): Divine Revelation and Human Knowledge--Discussions on the 
N ature of Scripture (k~takatva and purusatva); Direct Perception by the Yogins (yogi-
pratyaksa); Discussion on the Cognition through or without Forms (sakara-jnana-& nirakar-
a -jnana); The Omniscient Being in T忌ntricBuddhism一一一
Conclusion: The Contribution of the Sarvajna Study to the History of Comparative Thought 
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In the world with its Devas 
N 0 one equals me. 
For 1 am perfected in the wor1d， 
A teacher supreme am 1， 
1 a10ne am all-awakened 
Become coo1 am 1， Nibbana-attained. 
To turn the dhamma-whee1 
1 go to Kasi's city， 
Beating the drum of death1essness 
In a wor1d that's b1ind become. 
According to what you claim， your reverence， you ought to be victor of 
the unending. 
Like me， they are victors indeed 
Who have won destruction of the cankers; 
Vanquished by me are evi1 things， 
Therefore am 1， Upaka， a victor. 
When this had been said， monks， Upaka the Naked Ascetic， having said: 'May it be 
(so)， your reverence，' having shaken his head， went off having taken a different road. 
(Huveyya p' avuso' ti vatva sisam okampetva ummaggam gahetva pakkami."3 
It shou1d be noted that Ajivika Upaka's encounter with the Buddha preceded the 
Buddha's first sermon at Isipatana Migadaya in Saranganatha. It is true that Upaka 
noticed some unusually excellent qualities in the Buddha. But he cou1d not be persuad. 
ed to accept the Buddha as what the Buddha professed himself to be as an omniscient 
being. 
Thus， even in the earliest stage of the deve10pment of Buddhism， the Buddha 
proclaimed himself as all-knowing， acknowledging omniscience as one of the vital 
The present author remains very much thankful to the benefactions granted by Numata 
Foundation， Tokyo， and， with his pleasant memory of the four months in Oxford， he also 
wishes to express his deeply felt indebtedness to Professor Richard F. Gombrich and Mrs 
Gombrich (Dr. Gupta) for their kindness and for their good offices. 
2 Shinjo Kawasaki: lssaichi Shisoηo Kenkyu (A Study of the Buddhist Concept of an Omniscient 
Being)， (in Japanese)， (Shunjusha， Tokyo， 1992)， 564p.; dito.:“Study of the Mimamsa Chapter of 
Bha vya 'sMadhyamaka-hrdaya-karika一一-Textand Translation-一一(1)purva-paksa"，Studies， the 
lnstitute of PhilosoPhy， the Univer訂ty01 Tsukuba， NO.2 (March 1977)， pp.1-16; "Sanskrit and 
Tibetan Text一一一(2)uttara-paksa"， ibid.， NO.12 (March 1987)， pp.1-23;“Sanskrit and Tibetan 
Texts--(3)uttara-paksa， with the Sarvajna Chapter-一一"， ibid.， No.13 (March 1988)， pp.1-42 
3 Majjhima-Nikaya 1， pp.170-171; Horner tr.: Middle Length Sayings Vol.I， pp.214-215; Vinaya， 1， 1， 
6(Mahavagga). Cf. Dhammapada 353; Udana， 21， 1;SuttaηiJうata21; ltivuttaka 12. See also 
Mahavastu， II， p.326， ll.19-20; Lalitavistara， p.406， 1l.6-7; Catuhparisat-sutra， 10， 8;Notes by Franz 
Bernhard: Udanavarg仏 AbhandluηgeηderAkademie der Wissenschaft仰 inGottingeη， Philologisch 
Historische Klasse， Dritte Folge， Nr.54 (Gottingen， 1965). 
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elements of being a Buddha. This Buddha's proclamation of his own excellency， 
however， even before his first sermon， was accompanied by its negation， by a presenta-
tion of doubt in acknowledging omniscience as an essential property of Buddhahood. 
We might easily expect that every form of religion in any time and place， or every 
philosophical school， would regard omniscience (sarvajnatva) in the sphere of knowl-
edge， together with omnipotence (sarvesvaratva) and omnipresence (sarvagatatva) in 
the sphere of power and potentiality， as an essential property of perfection in the ideal 
ultimacy. Betraying such an expectation of ours， however， we could find no reference 
to the word "sarvajna" in the Rg-veda.4 There are only two to four cases of usage of 
its synonym“visva-vid"， applied to the Vedic deity， Agni (alias Soma).5 Another 
synonym: visva-veda is more frequently used.6 Of course， itdoes not necessarily mean 
that the concept of omniscience was not found in the Rg-veda. Varuna， or Varuna 
associated with Mitra， Varuna-Mitra， isknown to be all-knowing. He is “of wide 
vision (urucaksas， RV. i， 25， 5，16)".“with a thousand eyes" (sahasracaksas， ibid. vii， 34， 
10; sahasraksas， ibid. i， 23， 3)". He is all-knowing and seeing through a11 that is between 
heaven and earth， a1 that is beyond. He observes a1 to punish every wrongful action 
of everyone. Purusa， the Cosmic Man， isalso said to have a thousand eyes.7 In perusing 
the passages from the ancient parts of Vedic literature which contain the word sarva-
or compounds with sarva-， Prof. ]. Gonda， of Utrecht， made remarkable comments， 
arguing that the words sarva-and visva-are not necessarily tautological in character， 
and examining the etymological connection of sarva-with other lndo-Iranian equiva-
lents， Prof. Gonda concludes that the word“sarva" denotes something 0τa state 
“intact， uninjured， entire， complete， free from decay， illness， and death."8 We should 
keep in mind， for the moment， that the word:“sarvaj訂正， is not familiar in the Rg-veda. 
What is more， as far as the actual usage of the word “sarvajna" is concerned， in 
the Upanisads， too， there are only sporadic occurrences. The word can be found only 
in the Munda初一砂ωrzisad，9 the Prasna-[砂αnisad，1Oand some other Upanisads of 
somewhat later compositionY In the Upanisads， the knowledge of“All" was always 
4 Hermann Grassmann: Wδrlerbuch zum Rな-Veda， (Otto Harrassowitz， Wiesbaden， 1964)， p.1490. 
5 lbid.， pp目1301-1304.
6 lbid.， p.1303. 
7 Raffaele Pattazzone: The All-Knowing God， Researches into Early Religion and Culture， (autho-
rised translation by H. J. Rose)， (Methuen & Co. Ltd.， Loロdon).
8 ].Gonda:“Reflections on Sarva-in Vedic Texts"， lndiaη Liηguたtics，Vo1.l6 (Chatterji ]ubilee 
Volume)， (Linguistic Society of India， Madras， N ovember 1955)， p.69. 
9“kasmin nu bhagavo vijnate sarvam idam vijnatam bhavati"， Mundaka-U.ρ. 1， 1， 3;“yah sarvajnah 
sarva-vid yasya jnana-mayam tapah，" i・bid.1，1，9;“yahsarvajna sarvavid yasyaisa mahima bhuvi，" 
ibid.， I， 2，7. 
10 Prasna-UρIV，5;“sa saτvajnah sarvam evaviveseti，" ibid. IV， 10&11. 
11“sa tyakama -sarvajna tva -samyuktam，" Maitげ-Up. VI， 38; "yogisvarah sarvajno 'magho...."， ibid.， 
VII，l; "esa sarvesvarah， esa sarvajnah， eso 'ntaryami， esa yonih"， Mandukya-U.ρ，6 
4 
???
The Buddhist Concept of an Omniscient Being 
preceded by the knowledge of“That One Thingぺthatis to say， by the knowledge of 
the Atman， or by the knowledge of Brahman. And a person who comes to know that 
pure， imperishable Absolute， could know“All". 
In the Yoga-sutra， there is only two occurrences of the word; one in the form of 
sarvajna-bijal2 or the seed of all-knowing one， and the other in the form of sarva-
jnatrtva or the state of all-knowing person.13 Here，“a man who is omniscient" is“he 
who has only the full discernment of the difference between the Sattva and the Self 
(atman); Such a man has authority over a1 states of existence." 
With theistic tendencies strengthened， however， the word “sarvajna" comes to 
appear， with a great frequency， the later the more， in Hindu literature in general as 
well as in Buddhist and ] ain literature.14 
In the early Buddhist texts preserved in the Pali Canon， we can find several 
references to the Theravadins' claim for their Master's al-knowing ability in compari-
son with that of Purana Kassapa and the ] ain Master Mahavira.15 It is true， however， 
that the early Buddhist scriptures are filled with hesitant or rather dubious expressions 
about the precise nature of the Buddha's omniscience， as Prof. Padmanabha N. ] aini 
of Berkeley points out.16 While the ] ain claim for their Master Mahavira's omniscience 
could be traced in the precise and somewhat uniform meaning of their technical term 
“kevala-jna"， the definition of the Buddhist conception of their Master Buddha's 
omniscience remains enigmatic or ambivalent. Anyway， the Jains and the Buddhists at 
the early stages of their history discussed with each other the differences in their 
respective claims of the Master's omniscience， quite often， and were well acquainted 
with their opponents' tenets.17 In the Milinda-ραnha， there are several sections， some 
12“tatra niratisayam sarvajna-bijamぺYoga-suira，1， 25 
13 "sattva -purusanyatakhyati -ma trasya sarva -bha v忌dhisthatrtvamsarvajnatrtvam ca"， Yoga-sutra 
II， 48. 
14 Hermann J acobi: Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den lndern und daen Beweise /ur das Dasein 
Gottes， (Bonn & Leipzig， 1923); Otto Bohtlingk & Rudolph Roth ed.: Sanskn't-Wδrterbuch， Siebenter 
Teil (1872-1875， repr. Tokyo， 1976)， p.816; Cf. “sarvajnah sugato buddho dharmarajas tathagatah， 
samantabhadro bhagavan marajil lokajij jinah， sadabhijno dasabalo‘dvayavadi. vinayakah， 
munindrah srighanah sasta munih "， in Amarakosa; "Siva， Buddha， Paramesvara， Sarvajnanakar-
tari， Durga"， inT. Tarkavacaspati ed. Vacas.ραtyam， Vol. VI (Varanasi， 1962)， p.5268. 
15 Majjhima-Ni・kaya(Trenckner ed.)，Vol. 1， p.482; (I， 3，1: Tevijja-vacchagotta-suttam. 71); ibid. 五
(Chalmers ed.)， Vol. I， pp.127-128; (I， 4， 10: Kannakatthala -suttam 90)， p.132. 
16“… unlike the Jains， who understood the term sarvaj冗ain a literal manner， the early Buddhists used 
that term in a secondary metaphorical sense， namely， the ‘knower of Truth'， equivalent to the 
exclusively Buddhist term tathagata." (p.76) of Padmanabh S. Jaini:“011 the Sarvajnatva (Omni-
science) of Mahavira and the Buddha"， inL. Cousins et a1. ed.: Buddhist Studies in Hoηour 0/ 1. 
B. Horner， (D. Reidel， Dordrecht， 1974)， pp.71】90
17 Majjhima-Nikaya， Vol. 1， pp.92山95:(I，2，4: Culadukkhakl王handha-suttam14); ibid.， Vo1.I， p.31: (Il，3， 
9: Culasakuludayisuttam 79); Aカguttam-Nihaya(Warder rev. ed.) Vol.I， pp.220-222: (II， 74: Anal1da 
…vagga); ibid.(Hardy ed.)， Vol. IV， p.428. 
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old and some later additions， where discussions 0ロtheBuddha's omniscience are dealt 
with.18 There， itis clearly stated that the Buddha has perfect knowledge of any matter 
only when he wants to know and concentrates himself (吾vajjana)on that matter. Here 
again， constant and continuous knowledge of al things of a1 times simultaneously is 
clearly denied by the Buddha himself. 
In his Abhidharmakos，α， Vasubandhu (circa 400A.D.) discussed the Buddha's omni-
science in the opening verse and spoke of the differences in knowledge between the one 
acquired by the Buddha and the other gained by an Arhat like S言riputr・a.19In the last 
chapter: Pudgala-viniscaya， of the Abhidharmakosa， Vasubandhu again introduced the 
discussions held by the Vaibhasikas and the Mahasamghikas on the nature of the 
Buddha's knowledge. Vasubandhu seems to be Ioyal enough to his Vaibhasika tenet 
that the Buddha could get knowledge of a1 only by the e1apse of two moments (ksana 
-s)， knowledge of al except the knowing subject in the first moment， and knowledge 
of the knowing subject in the succeeding moment， denying the possibi1ity of knowledge 
of al simultaneously at one moment.20 
In the Buddhist scriptures， we can observe another conspicuous pattern of criti-
cism of the Buddha's omniscience. The Buddha is criticized on the grounds that his 
lack of omniscience would be evident from his deeds in his life-history which would 
indicate his failure to anticipate future events. For instance， he entered aηempty 
village at the time of a great festivity and failed to receive any a1ms. He met the fierce 
elephant Dhanapala released purposely by King Ajatasattu. He failed to anticipate 
Devadatta's intrigue of rock-dropping. He could not save the 1ife of Sundari， a poor 
Brahmana girl killed and foresaken. He had to ask the names of people， of villages to 
find his way. Ten such cases to prove the Buddha's lack of knowledge， the original 
version of which we can find in such a Pali text as the Majjihima-Nikaya21 and the 
Mil仇ぬ-panha，22 are repeatedly enumerated as“the Buddha's Ten Acts of Insuffi-
ciency" in the Chinese version of the Mahayana Ratnakata-siUra corpus. Just before he 
Ieft J apan， the present speaker had a chance to read the article written by Prof. Paul 
Harrison of the University of Canterbury， New Zealand， titled“Some Reflections on 
the Persona1ity of the Buddha"， pub1ished from Otani University， KyotO.23 In this 
18 V. Trenckner ed.: The Milindatanho， being Dialogues between King Milind，ασηd the Buddhi圃'stSage 
五 Nagase仰， (London， 180; 1962， PTS repr.)， p.74; pp.102-107; p.l08; p.135; p.210; p.217; p.232; p.267; p. 
272. 
19 p， Pradhan ed.: Abhidharma-Kosha-bhasya 01 Vasubαηdhu， Tibefan SaηskガtWorks Seη・es，VIII 
(Patna， 1967)， p.l 
20 lbid.， p.467; p.9; p.404; p.412; p.471; p.474; p.478. 
21 Ma;jhima-Nikσya， 1， 519; }ataka 1， p.6; I， pp.415-417; V， p.31. 
22 Miliηdaρanha， p.135 
23 Paul Harrison:“Some reflections on the Personality of the Buddha"， Otani Gakuho Vo1.74， No.4 
(Kyoto， March 1995)， pp.1-28. 
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article， Prof. Harrison discussed the issue of the Buddha's Ten Bad Karma (dasa-
karma-ploti/pluti) in the Lokanuvartana-sutra and mentioned his indebtedness to the 
doctoral dissertation of Dr. Sally Mellick-Cutler of Oxford for drawing this issue in 
the entire Apadana collection to his attention.24 And the present speaker would like to 
add another remark that the same pattern of criticism could a1so be found in the 
discussions found in two Mahayana Sastras preserved only in Chinese trans1ation: the 
Ta-chih-tu-/un (Mahã.戸raJ冗d戸ãramitã-~ψadesa-sastra) and the Shih-chu-ρヲ-jJ'0-sha-
lun (Dasa-bhumi-vibhasa-sastra). The former Sastra， (which is translated into French 
by Monseigneur Etienne Lamotte，)25 is important because of its popularity and of its 
great inf1uence in the Chinese and the J apanese Buddhism， while the latter Sastra is 
noteworthy as it is the only extant Buddhist scripture， which has an independent 
chapter named:“Chapter of Criticism of an Omniscient Person."26 
The Buddha's Omniscience in the沼ahayanaTexts 
1n the Prajnaparamita literature of Mahayana Buddhism， which developed in 1ndia 
as early as the second century of the Christian Era， there are frequent references to the 
Buddha's omniscience. 1n the case of the MahめraJ舟ゆiiramita-sutra 01 25，000 Verses 
(Pancavimぬtisahαsrika-Pr.)，the frequency of reference is so high that we could find the 
word:“issai-chi (sarvajna)"， two or three times on every page， applied to the knowI-
edge of the Buddha.27 Of course， what is meant by the word:“buddha"， has been 
changed from the straightforward designation of Gautama the Buddha in the early 
Buddhist scriptures to the advanced notion of Buddhahood as an embodiment of 
transcendental principle in the Mahayana scriptures. 1n the Abhisamayalamkara com-
mentary tradition of the Astasahasrika-Pγα'inti，戸aramita-sutra， there deve10ped the three 
kinds of perfection in sacred knowledge: Marga-jnana for a Sravaka， Sarva-jnana for 
a Pratyekabuddha， and Sarvakara-jnana as a specific compound term applied to the 
most exalted form of omniscience monopolized by the Samyaksambuddha. 1n some 
classical Y ogacara texts， Sarvakarajnata is understood to pertain to the general 
24 Sally Mellick-Cutler:“The Pali Apadana Collection"， Journal 01 the Pali Text Society， Vo1. 
XX(1994)， pp.1-42; Jonathan S. Walters:“The Buddha's Bad Karma: A Problem in the History of 
Theravada BuddhismぺNumen，XXXVII， 1 (1990)， pp.70-95 
25主tienneLamotte: Le T:γσite de la Grande Vertu de Sage5se de Nagaη・μna仰向hatrajnataramitaSas 
tra) ， Tome 1 (Louvain， 1949; 196); Tome I (1949; 1967); Tome II (1970); Tome IV (1976); Tome V 
(1980) 
26 See Chapter 6:“Avyakrta， Sarvajna -Criticism， and the Ma:dhyamaka"， inShoson Miyamoto: 
Chudo Shiso oyobi 50ηo Hattat5u (The Madhyamaka Thought and its Development)， (in ]apanese)"， 
(Hozokan， 194). Present author is preparing an annotated English translation of “Chapter of 
Criticism of an Omniscient Person" of the Sastra from the Chinese version with a study 
27 Tensho Kimura: The Sanskrit Text of the Pa汚cavimsaiisah品川'ka-Praf匁砂aramita-sutra (Sankibo， 
Tokyo， 1988)， 4vols 
?
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characteristics of things， while Sarvajnata to every specific existent.28 
In this connection， Prof. Paul J. Griffiths of Chicago Divinity School recently 
contributed an article on the Buddhist idea of omniscience in the Mahay伽 asutrala悦 a-
ra.29 It is a study which is limited in scope to a single， but very important Yogacara 
text， with the intention to examine how ideas about omniscience fit into Yogacara 
epistemology and soteriology. 
One typical Mahayana Sutra， the Avatamsaka-sutra， which was originated in India， 
developed its full-fledged system more in China as Hua-yan， and final1y in Japan as 
Kegon. This Sutra30 evokes the cosmic vision of a universe where everything freely 
interpenetrates everything else. It introduces to us an image of the Jewel N et of Indra 
(indrajala). viz.， a vast web-network consisting of perfect spherical mirror-gems， each 
of which reflects every other， and which also reflects the reflections in every other， 
inc1uding its own reflection，一--andso on ad infinitum. Here， the totality of the universe 
could be contemplated even in the tiniest speck of dust， as realization of the ultimate 
truth. Al1 in one， and one in al1. Thus， the A vatαmsaka-sutra shares a cosmic vision and 
interpretation with some Buddhist Tantras of a later development which is fully 
displayed in the form of Mandalas. 
We can tel from the Sanskrit fragments collected from the Bhavana-krama， that 
there used to be in the opening chapter of the Mahavairocanabhisambodhi-sutγendra a 
passage which reads:“That which is the knowledge of the Omniscient Being has 
benevolence for its basis， the Bodhicitta for its cause， and expedient means for its 
ultimacy. (tad etad sarvajna-jnanam karun吾-mulambodhicitta-hetukam upaya-par-
yavasanam)".31 This would serve as a starting point of investigation of the concept of 
an omniscient being in the later development of Tantric Buddhism. 
Controversies on Omniscience among Jains， Buddhists and Mimamsakas 
It was after the discovery， and publication of the Sanskrit manuscript of the 
Tatlvasamgraha of Santaraksita with its commentary， the Tatlvasamgra加すα冗jikaof 
Kamalasila， that the issue of omniscience came to be noticed for the first time in 
??
28 Seitetsu Moriyama:“Kamalasila and Haribhadra--on their Justifications of the Knowledge of 
an Omniscient Being一一(inJ apanese)"， inthe Journal 01 the Ja仰 neseAssociation 01 lndian仰 d
Buddhist Studies， Vo1.35， No.1， (Tokyo， December 1986)， p.1l5-119; dito.:“The Y ogacara-
Madhyamika Refutation of the Position of the Satyakara-and Al!kakara-vadins of the Yogacara 
School--A Translation of Portions of HaribhadrぜsA bhisamayalamkaraloka Prajnaparamitavyak-
hya一一"， in the Proceediηgs 01 the Gmduate School 01 BukkyδU，のersity，Part 1 (March 1984)， p. 
1-58; Part II(October 1984)， pp.l-35; Part II (December 1984)， pp.1-28. 
29 Paul ]. Griffiths:“Omniscience in the Mahayanasutralankara and lts Commentaries"， inlndo-
1mηiαη Journal， Vo1. 33 (Dordrecht， 1990)， pp.85-120. 
30 Gαηdαvyuha (P. L. Vaidya ed.)， p.6 
31 Giusep戸eTucci: Minor Buddhist Texls， Part I (IsMEO， Roma， 1958)， p.196. 
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modern studies of Buddhism. In 1873， in a J ain monastery in J aisalmer in the western 
India， Dr. Georg Buhler found a manuscript consisting of 183 palm-leaves which bore 
on the corner， the title“Kamal，αsila-tarka". Some years later， Pandit C. D. Dalal was 
deputed by the order of the Maharaja of Baroda， His Highness Sir Sayaji Rao 
Gaekwad， to J aisalmel. He， with undaunted efforts， succeeded in securing a loan of the 
manuscripts from the Vadi Parsvanatha Bhandar in Pattan with the objective of 
publishing the work in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series， Baroda. As a result， Pandit 
Embar Krishnamacharya of Vadtal edited the text and published it in two volumes in 
1926 on the occasion of the golden jubilee of the l¥1aharaja with an elaborate English 
foreword composed by the General Editor of the series， B. Bhattacaryya.32 And in 1937 
-39， Mahamahop註dhyayaGangan註thaJh註madeits English translation and published 
it in two volumes in the same series.33 This is the story of how the Sanskrit text of the 
Tattvαsamgraha is now in our hands. Its last chapter named: Atindriyarthadarsi-purusa 
-pariksa， or“the Chapter of Examination of the Person of Super-N ormal Vision" is 
a big chapter， consisting of as many as 522 verses， (N oS.3124-3646)， wholly dedicated 
to an examination of the Buddhist idea of an omniscient being (sarvajna). 
In connection with this publication of the Taitvasamgraha， we cannot overlook the 
contributions of Prof. K. B. Pathak of Deccan College to the studies of Buddhist and 
Jain concepts of an omniscient being. As early as 1889， and up-to his death which came 
out in 1932， Prof. Pathak made strenuous efforts in checking and comparing the 
passages in the J ain works such as Patrakesarin's Astasahasri and Prabhacandra's 
Prameyakamalamartanda， the Buddhist works such as the above-mentioned Santara-
ksita's Tattvasαmgraha， Kamalasi1a's Taitvasαmgraha-ρα冗，;ika，and Mimamsaka 
Kumarila's Slokαvartti，初， and some later compendium works like S註yana-Madhava's
Sarva-darsaηα-samgraha.34 He proved the existence of repeated and heated contro-
versies among the J ains， the Buddhists， and the Mimamsakas of the Brahmanical 
orthodox philosophical system， on their respective concepts of Sarvajna in India in the 
sixth to the eighth centuries， down to the eleventh century or even later. 
32 Ember Krishnamacharya ed.: Tattvasangraha olSaηtaraksita， with the Commentary of Kamalasila， 
Gaekωad's Oriental Series， N os. 30 &31 (Baroda， 1926). 
3 Ganganatha Jha tr.: The Tatlvasangraha 01 Santaraksita with the Commentary of Kamalasila， 
Gaekwad's Oriental Ser党s，Vol. LXXX (Baroda， 1937)， & Vol. LXXXIII (Baroda， 1939) 
34 K. B. Pathak:“Kumarila's Verses Attacking the Jain Buddhist Notions of an Omniscient Beings"， 
in Annals 01 the Bhandarkar On'ental Research Institute， Vol. XII， Pt.2 (Poona， 1931)， pp.123-131; 
Dito.:“The Position of Kumarila in Digambara Jaina Literature"， inThe Traηsactions 01 the 
Ninth International On'entalists Congress (Loηdon， 1892)， pp.186-214; Dito.:“Santaraksita's Refer. 
ence to Kumarila's Attacks on Samantabhadra and Akalankadeva"， inAnnals 01 the Bhandarkar 
Oriental Research Institute， Vol. XI (Poona， 1930)， pp.155-164; Dito.:“Santaraksita， Kamalasila 
and Prabhacandra"， inAnnals 01 the Bhandarkar Oriental Reseαrch Institute， Vol. XII (Poona， 
1931)， pp.81-83 
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The Mimamsaka Kumarila claimed that knowledge of Dharma and Adharma， 
which is super-sensory， isnot possible through perception (pratyaksa) or inference 
(anumana)， but it can be obtained only through revelation by the eternal Vedas， which 
are understood to be not made by a human hand (apauruseya). And the words of the 
Vedas are neither revealed by an omniscient God， nor pronounced by any human being 
claiming himself to be omniscient. For the Buddhist logicians， itis their category of a 
Yogin's super-sensory perception (yogi-jnana or yogi-pratyaksa) that goes with the 
Buddha's transcendent capacity of knowing al (sarvajnatva). Kumarila vigorously 
rejected the possibility of such a super-sensory perception in aロyhuman being， inthe 
Buddha as well as in Mah吾vira.In the last part of this chapter， there are fifteen verses 
attacking the Buddhist concept of omniscience attributed Samata and Yajnata， (two 
Mimamsakas whose names may sound faked in association with the Sama-veda and 
Yajur-veda). Their discussions are concerned to the cognition with form or the modes 
of appearance (sakara-jnana) and one without any such form or modes of appearance 
(nirakara -jnana).35 
Thus， we have come to know from the works of Santaraksita and Kamalasila， 
who were active in the latter ha1f of the eighth century， that their excellent predeces-
sors， the founders of Buddhist logic， (who preceded them in date by one and a half 
centuries)， Dignaga and Dharmakirti， were the main target of Mlmamsaka Kurηarila's 
attack， (not to mention the J ain attacks). It can be said that on the basis of Prof. 
Pathak's contributions， remarkable works have been achieved in the field of J ain 
studies of their Master's omniscience and comparison with the Buddhist parallel 
concept. To mention some of the achievements; K. N. J ayatilleke's gigantic work: 
Early Buddhist Theoη101 Kηoωledge，36 E. A. SoIomon:“The Problem of Omniscience 
(sarvajnatva)"37， and Padmanabha J aini's comparative analysis of Buddhist and J ain 
ideas about omniscience，3B Chitrarekha Kher:“Some Aspects of the Concept of 
??
35 There is a big lacuna in the this part of the Sanskrit text of the Panjika of Kamasila in the Baroda 
Sanskrit text of the Tattvasamgraha， and in Bauddha Bharati edition. See Dwarikadas Shastri ed.: 
Tattvasaηgraha 0/λcaηa Shantaraksita， with the Commentary 'Pa均:ika'of Shri Kamalashila， 
Bauddha Bharati Series N 0.1 (Varanasi， 1968)， 2 vols. So the content of the discussions held in the 
section could be known only through the Tibetan translation. Strangely enough the discussion on 
the cognition with (or without) form (akara) does not fit to the genuine tenets of the Mimamsakas. 
Cf.“Any discussion regarding formJessness and the rest is of no use in regard to the omniscient 
person. (nirakaradi-cinta tu sarvajne nopayujyate.)" (TS v.3646); "The discussion that we carried 
on earlier， regarding the cognition being formless， etc.， from the idealistic point of view，一一can
serve no useful purpose on the present occasion， as against you Mimamsakas who are wedded to 
the external world， when we are proving the existence of the omniscient person on the understand-
ing for the sake of argument that the external world exIsts." InJha's tr. of TSP v.3646， p.1579. 
36 K. N. J ayati Ileke: Early Buddhist Theoη01 Knowledge， (Allen & Unwin， London， 1963) 
37 E. A. Solomon:“The Problem of Omniscience (Sarvajnatva)"， inAdyar Library Bulletin No.26 
(Adyar， 1962)， pp.36-77. 
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Omniscience (sarvajnata) in Buddhismぺ39 N. Ram J ee Singh: The Jaina Coηcept 01 
OmniscienceベH.M. Bhattacharyya:“Omniscience (sarvajn引き)and Metaphysics of 
Knowledge (adhigama) in Jainism".41 Thus， except for Th. Stcherbatsky， Ganganatha 
]ha， and S. C.Vidyabhi1sana， Prof. Pathak must be the first to be remembered for his 
contributions to the study of logical and epistemological aspects of the Sarvajna 
concept. 
In 1982， Prof. Erich Frauwallner of Vienna， added one more valuable piece of 
information that it was not Kumarila's Slokavl1rttika， but， his Brhatt政1，which is now 
lost and only available from fragments， that bore the brunt of the attacks from the Jain 
and the Buddhist logicians in the above-mentioned controversies.42 
Here is a riddle the present author would like to propose to you， rather in jest. 
Could the almighty， omnipotent God deign to have hiccups? One possible answer may 
be as follows: Being almighty， of course， God could have hiccups as any ordinary 
person， with al of his human defects and limitations， can have. But， when we come to 
know that hiccups are caused involuntarily by some spasmodic contractions of the 
diaphragm， that answer may lead to a dilemma. Does God allow something to arise 
involuntarily in himself? Of course， not. And， then， ifthere were something， anything 
whatsoever， that God could not do， then God would not be omnipotent. Or， itmay be 
possible for God to have hiccups in His unique way， quite different from the human 
way of involuntary contractions of the diaphragm. ln that case， however， could the 
hiccups of God， which are not caused by involuntary contractions of diaphragm， be 
entitled to be called， and defined， as hiccups at all? Or you may answer from an 
existential standpoint， saying that man was made by God in such a way that he can 
have hiccups， while God cannot. All that is a display of divine omnipotence， divine 
providence. Anyway， you are living in a more sophisticated tradition in Oxford and 
through many years have prepared yourselves for such questions of Theodicy. 
The lndian Buddhist logicians like Dignaga and Dharmakirti， tried to solve similar 
problems of Theodicy. Could the Buddha know things by an epistemological process， 
analogous to that of human knowledge? Is it right for us to consider the structure of 
the Buddha's all-knowing knowledge through the same procedure of research as that 
which we use to study for human brain composition? Thus we come to the boundary 
38 Padmanabh S. J ain，。ρ.cit. (1974); dito.“On the Ignorance of the Arhat"， inBuswell & Gimello 
ed.: Paths to Liberation， (Kuroda Institute， Honolulu， 1992)， pp.135-145. 
39 Chitrarekha Kher:“Some Aspects of the Concept of Omniscience (sarvajnata) in Buddhism， in
A nnals 0/ Bhandar.たarOrienial Research lnstiute， Vol.LlI (1973)， pp. 175-182. 
40 Ram J eSingh: The Jaiηα Concept 01 Omniscience (L. D. Institute of Indology， Ahmedabad， 1974). 
41 H. M. Bhattacharyya: "Omniscience (sarvajnata) and Metaphysic of Knowledge (adhigama) in 
Jainism"， inKaviraj Abhinandana Grantha ， (Lakhnau， 1967) 
42 Erich FrauwalIner:“Kumarila's Brhattika"， inWiener Zeitschηヌlurdie Kunde Sud-und 
Ostasiens， Bd. VI (Wien， 1962)， pp.78-90 
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between Buddhism as a positive science of epistemology and Buddhism as a re1igion of 
transcendental value. 
Here， on the one hand， we can recall the half-resignatory sigh of Dharmakirti in 
his Pramaηωarttika on being faced with the profundity of transcendental value: 
"The realm of Yogins is unfathomable. 
(acintya yoginam gatih)"43 
On the other hand， the following Mangala-verse of Dignaga in his Pramana-
samuccaya exhibited an typical attitude of the Buddhist logicians of the sixth century 
of the Christian Era and later， toward the spiritual place or position that the alト
knowing existence of authority could hold in their positive science of epistemology. 
“Saluting him， who has become a means of valid cognition (pramaI!a-bhuta)， 
who seeks the benefit of al living beings Uagad-dhitaisin)， who is the teacher 
(sastr)， the Sugata， the protector (tayin)， 1 shal1， for the purpose of establishing the 
means of valid cognition， compose the Pra泊αnasamuccaya，uniting here under one 
head my theories scattered in many treatises." 
pramana -bhutaya j agad-dhi taisine 
pranamya sastre sugataya tayine 
pramana-siddhyai sva-matat samuccayah 
karisyate viprasrtad ihaikatahj 
(Pramanasamuccaya， quoted in Vibhuticandra.)"44 
For the Buddhists， the Buddha offers a goal and guidance for human activity that 
cannot be derived from ordinary means of cognition， i.e.， perception and inference. 
However， itshould be necessary to prove that he is an authority for this， for faith alone 
is an insufficient motive for being a Buddhist. The statement that the Buddha is a 
means of valid cognition is proven through reference to the means by which he has 
become one (pramana-bhuta)" 
Prof. Ernst Steinkel1ner's study of what can be reconstructed of ]nanasrimitra's 
Sarvaj伽 siddhiand his study of the Tibetan equivalent word to Pramana-bhuta，“ and 
43 Pramanavarttika， I， 532d. 
4 Masaaki Hattori: Dignaga， On Percゆtoη，being the Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's 
Pramanasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions， translated and annotat. 
ed， (Cambridge， Mass.， 1968)， p‘518 
45 Ernst Steinkellner:“]nanasrimitra's Sarvαj冗asiddhihぺin1. Lancaster ed: Praj冗aparamitaand 
Re!ated Systems， Studies in honor 01 Edward Coηze， (Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series， 1977)， pp 
383-393; ditto.:“Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem im Buddhismus"， in G. Oberhammer ed 
Transzendenzeだゐhntηg，Vollzugshon'zont des Heils， (Wien， 1978)， pp.121-134; dito.:“Tshad ma'i 
skyes bu; Meaning and Historical Significance of the Term"， inWiener Studien zur Tibetologie 
und Buddhismuskunde， Heft 1 (Wien， 1983)， pp.274-284; dito.:“The Spiritual Place of the 
Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism"， inNaηto Bukkyσ， No.49 (Nara， December 1982)， pp.l-
18. 
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Prof. Tilmann Vetter's study of Dharmakirti's epistemological theory in the 
Pramanasiddhi chapter of the Pramanavarttikα46 and Prof. Gudrun Buhnemann's 
translation and study of Ratnakirti's Sarvaj克αsiddhi47offer very important materials 
for analysis of the lndian Buddhist logicians' position on omniscience after Dignaga. 
Prof. David S. Ruegg's examination of the words: pramana-bhuta， or pramana-(bhuta) 
-purusa， saksatkrta-dharman may also be mentioned as one of the most recent 
contributions.48 Some names of the J apanese scholars like Hideomi Yaita，ωYushδ 
Wakahara，50 and Shigeaki Watanabe51， together with Vittorio A. van Bijlert，52 and 
others can be mentioned here， too. 
Omniscient Being in the Madhyamaka-hrdaya 
N ow， we come to the last， but not the least important topic. The last two chapters 
of the Mαdhyamaka-hraαya of Bhavya， junior contemporary of Dignaga. The study of 
the Buddhist concept of an omniscient being by the present speaker started with a 
Buddhist logician's work， the last chapter of the Tattvαsamgraha: Atindriyarthadarsi-
purusa-pariksa， and then he proceeded to examinations of the last two chapters of 
Bhavya or Bhavaviveka's Mαdhyamaka-hγdaya-karika available in Sanskrit manu-
script and its (so-assumed) auto-commentary， Tarkajvala， which is extant only in 
Tibetan translation.53 
46 Tilmann Vetter: “Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakirti"， in Sitzuηgsberichte， Osterreichische 
Aたademieder Wissenschalteη， Philosophisch-Historische Klasse， 245-2 (Wien， 1964); dito.: Der 
Buddha und seIne Lehγe in Dhα円nakiriisPramaγ2avarttikα， in Wiener Studien zur Tibeto!ogie uγzd 
Buddhismuskunde， Heft 12 (Wien， 1984). 
47 Gudrun Buhnemann: Der A llwissende Buddha， ein Beweis uηd seiηe Probleme; Rafnαkirtis Sarvα:j-
nasiddhi， ubersetzt uηd kommentiert， in Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskuηde， 
Heft 4 (Wien， 1980). 
48 David Seyfort Ruegg: “ Pramanabhuta， ョーPramana(bhuta)-purusa， Pratyaksadharman and Saksat-
krtadharman as Epithets of the Rsi， Acarya and Tathagata in Grammatical， Epistemological and 
Madhyamaka Texts"， in Bulletiη 01 the School 01 0η:enta! and Alrican Studies， University of 
London， VoL LVII (London， 1994)， pp.303-320. 
49 Hideomi Yaita:“Dharmakirti on the Person Free from Faults， Annotated Translation of the 
Pramanavarttil?asvavrttih ad v.218-223ぺinProceedings 01 the Nαηtasan lnstitute 01 Buddhist 
Studiむ， NO.ll (Narita， 1988)， pp.433-445 
50 Yusho Wakahara:“Dharmaklrti and Subhagupta--on the Sruti-pariksa and the Sarvaj伽ゴiddhi
一一(inJ apanese)"， inthe Journal 01 the Japanese Association 01 lndian and Buddhist Studies， Vol 
37， No.2， (Tokyo， March 1989)， pp.187-190_ 
51 Shigeaki Watanabe:“Subhagupta's Sa仰 aj先aSl・ddhi・karika"， inProceedings 0/ the Naritasaη/ηstitute 
。1Buddhist Studies， No.lO (Narita， 1986)， pp.55-74. 
52 Vittorio A. van Bijlert: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority， in Wiener Studien zur Tibetologieωld 
Buddhismuskunde， Heft 20 (Wien， 1989). 
53 ShinjδKawasaki: "Criticism of the Buddhist Idea of Sarvajna as Found in the lattvasamgraha (in 
J apanese)"， inthe Journal 0/ the Jcψαnese Association 0/ lndian and Buddhist 5tμdies， Vol.l1， No. 
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The following is a short history of the discovery of this precious Karika section 
of the Madhyamaka-hrdaya manuscript and how it was made accessible to US.54 
1n summer 1936， the lndian Pandit Rev. Rahula Samkrtyayana visited Sha lu ri 
phug Monastery， about one mile away from the road Shigartse-to-Gyantse， and found 
some important Sanskrit manuscripts including Manorathanandin's commentary of 
the Pramanavarttika， and the Vigrahavyavartani， the Ksanabhangadhyaya， and the 
Tarkα!jvala.55 As he could not wait for the arrival of photo-film enough to copy al of 
them before the coming of snow， he began to copy the manuscript of the ~αγ初:jvãlã in 
his own hand-writing. 
The Sanskrit text of the Madhyamaka-hrdayαthus copied by Rev. Samkrtyayana 
is kept in Patna. Prof. V. V. Gokhale in Poona copied Rahula's text in his own hand 
寸町iting56and offered it to us， together with the photos of the same Sanskrit manu-
script taken by Dr. Giuseppe Tucci of IsMEO during the latter's last journey to Tibet. 
This material was studied by a group of scholars under the leadership of Prof. Gokhale 
until he passed away in December 1993. The scholars concerned in the project are Dr. 
Hajime N akamura， Dr. Jikido Takasaki， and Dr. Yasunori Ejima， Dr. N aomichi 
Nakada， Prof. A. F. Thurman， and others57. The present writer had a chance to read 
the text under Prof. Gokhale's guidance in Poona， lndia， in 1970， and he is now a 
member of that group， taking charge of the Ninth Chapter: Mimams孟-tattva-nirnaya 
-avatara and the Tenth Chapter: Sarvajna-siddhi-nirdesa of this text. 
According to what Rev. Samkrtyayana reported，“The manuscript was worn out， 
the page numbers are gone， and ascribed toくBhagavadviveka>.It was written in 
Ramjana(?) script， with 5 or 6 lines on each leaf consisting of 24 leaves of the size 22. 
5 x 2 inches， and considered complete(?)."58 Now this originaI manuscript was moved 
from Sha lu Monastery in Tibet to Beijing， and is kept with great care in the Min-zu 
-tu-shu-guan in Beijing. Photo-copies， newly taken from the original and arranged 
2 (Tokyo， March 1963)， pp.548-549; dito.: "Quotations in the Mimamsa Chapter of Bhavya's 
Madhyama知-hrdaya-karika"，in the Journal 01 the Jaρanese Association 01 lndiaη and Buddhist 
Studi凸・，Vo1.2， N 0.2 (Tokyo， March 1974)， pp.l120-1127 
54 Rahula Samkrtyayana:“Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-leaf Mss. in Tibet (with plates)"， in
Journal 01 the Bihar and Orissa Research Society， VoI.XXIII， Pt. 1， (Patna， 1937)， pp.1-57. 
5 Rev. Samkrtyayana preferred to cal the manuscript as the Tarkajvala， and not the Madhyama初
hrd，αya-karika. 1n the colophon of the Sha lu Monastery Manuscript， itreads “Tarkajvalaηama 
sutram samattmη" (25a). 1t would suggest that， contrary to our common usage， there might be 
a possible tradition to designate by the title:“the Tar.加:jvala"the Karika section of the work， and 
not necessarily its commentary 
56 Shrikant S. Bahulkar:“The Madhyamaka-Hrdaya-Karika of Bhavaviveka: A Photographic Repro-
duction of Prof. V. V. Gokhale's Copy"， inSambhasa: Nagoya Studies in lndian Culture and 
Buddhism， NO.15 (University of Nagoya， 1994)， pp.i-iv十1-49.
57 See Bahulkar， ibid.， p. iーi，for the list of the temporary reports by the respective collaborators. 
58 Samkrtyayana， ot. cit.， P目15;p.48 
???
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with a short introduction， are made available by Dr. Jiang-zhong-xin.59 
In the N inth Chapter of the Madhyamaka-hrdaya， Bha vya introduces some 
opponent's view represented by the Mim吾msakas.The Mimamsakas put a stress on 
the importance of the Three Vedas (trayi) as the ultimate source of knowledge， 
whereas Bhavya emphasizes the role of reasoning (anumana). Through examinations 
of the probans such as “purusatvat" and “krtakatvatぺBhavyaestablishes the author-
ity of the Buddha as the infallible source of knowledge， denying authority to the Vedas. 
This is one of the earliest examples of testimony of the Buddha's omniscience that 
preceded Dharmakirti's argumentation. 
In the Tenth Chapter， dealing with the opponent's view presented by the N agnas 
or J ains， Bhavya examines the cases in the life-history of the Buddha which are often 
quoted as evidences for the Buddha's ignorance and imperfection. Bhavya states 
clearly that this discussion is based on the [}j戸ãya-kau~αかα-sütra 60 and， as we have seen 
above，61 it presents us with a noteworthy parallel with the pattern of Sarvajna-
criticism in the ear1y Buddhist texts of the Apadana corpus and in the Chinese 
Buddhist sources. 
Well， this is the text which the present speaker would like to read with you on 
Wednesday for the forth-coming eight weeks. To read this text of Bhavya kept in 
Sanskrit fragments compared with the Tibetan translation could provide us with much 
knowledge of the Buddhist， the J ain， and the Mimamsaka ideas of omniscience which 
preceded， indate， Dignaga and Kumarila. (When compared with the Tibetan editions 
kept in the Tibetan Tripitaka of the sDe dge edition， the sNar thang edition and the 
Peking edition， the Sanskrit text of the Ninth Chapter of the Madhyamα均一hrd，αya-
karika， which counts 148 verses as a whole， differs in several parts.)62 It can be expected 
to be a valuable contribution to clarification of the ideological situation of pre-
DharmakIrtian Indian epistemology. 
For years after the establishment of modern Indological and Buddhological studies 
first initiated by Prof. Friedrich Max Muller (1823-1900) and others here in Oxford， 
59 Jiang Zhong-xin:“Sanskrit Tarkajvala-Sutra Manuscript Copy (in Chinese)"， inPaρ6月 inHonour 
。1/Dr. Ji Xian-lin on the Occasion 01 his 80th Birthday， (Jiang-xi， China， 1991)， pp.212-217， with 
12 pages of photo-reproduction. 
60 The Tibetan version of the Tarkajvala quotes the Sutra to tel the story of the Buddha's needle 
wound in a Khadira thorn-forest at great length (sDe-dge edition， 325a7-325b1). The Buddha 
suffered the injury in his leg as the retribution of his killing of a villain menacing the lives of five 
hundred passeロgersin his past life of the ship captain. The story is noteworthy as it tels the 
Buddha's positive crime of murder in his past life and its retribution. 
61 See Harrison，。ρ.cit.， the Section of the [j.ρaya-kausalya-sutra in the Chinese version. 
62 ShinjδKawasaki:“Discrepancies in the Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts of Bhavya's Mαdhyamaka-
hrdaya-Tarkajvala (the IXth and Xth Chapters)， Tibetan Studies， Proceedings 01 the 5th Seminar 
01 the International Association 01 Tibetaη Studies (N arita， 1992)， pp.131-143 
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variour fields of study such as the Early Buddhism， the Abhidharma Literature， 
the Saddhaγmaρund，仰すたα-sutra，the Pure Land Thought， the Madhyamaka， the 
Vijnanavada-Yogacara， the Tathagata-garbha Theory， Tantric Buddhism， and the 
Buddhist Epistemology and Logic， have been explored energetically by many ardent 
and diligent scholars in the world. In J apan， too， where Buddhism has enjoyed a long 
historical and religious tradition， we could gain an important advantage from a 
combination of cultural traditions and scholarly achievements. The notion of an 
omniscient being (sarvajna)， however， has as yet been paid rather little attention in 
J apan and remains unexplored. N 0 systematic or historical study in a modern 
scholarly way has ever been undertaken to explore terms for and ideas about omni-
science as an essential property of Buddhahood. A clear-sighted consideration of the 
idea of an omniscient being with a thorough examination following valid philological 
procedures， and with frequent textual references， can be expected to be a significant 
addition and creative contribution to the study of the history of human ideas. 
Of course， this subject has so vast a scope that it may be inevitable that an attempt 
like ours would elicit some further systematization and elaboration in the future. When 
we inquire into the nature and characteristics of the Buddha's knowledge， and when we 
compare this with Aristotelian concept of the Infinite and Totality，63 with the similar 
ideas of the philosophers such as Philon in Alexandria， with the theological discussions 
of the Mediaeval Period in Europe， or wIth the mathematical treatments by modern 
logical positivists，64 the universal importance attached to investigate the concept of 
omniscience may be clearly observed. In this way， we can hope for future developments 
in the comparative study of similar important philosophical ideas‘ 
In this connection， a paper by Prof. Roy羽TPerrett of Massey University， N ew 
Zealand:“Omniscience in Indian Philosophy of Religion" can be mentioned as a new 
attempt to offer a general characterization of the concept of omniscience in both 
Western and Indian philosophy of religion.65 It is filled with valuable suggestions 
referring to the recent works of Peter Geach，66 Richard Swineburne，67 and Jonathan L. 
63“The infinite turns out to be the contrary of what it is said to be. It is not what has nothing outside 
it that is infinite， but what always has something outside it.…Thus something is infinite if， taking 
it quantity by quantity， we can always take something outside. On the other hand， what has 
nothing outside it is complete and whole. For thus we define the whole-that from which nothing 
is wanting， as a whole man or box ヘAristotle:Physics 206b34-207al0 Oonathan Barnes tr.): 
The Complete Works 01 A n'stotle， Vol. 1 (Princeton， 1984)， p.352. 
64 Roland Puccetti:“1s Omniscience Possible?"， Australasian Journal 01 Philosophy， Vo1.41， (1963)， p. 
92-93; N orman Kretzmann:“Omniscience and Immutability"， inThe Journal 01 Philosophy， No. 
63 (1966)，; Hector-N eri Castaf¥eda:“Omniscience and 1ndexical Reference"， inThe Journal 01 
Philosoρhy， (1962). 
65 Roy W. Perrett:“Omniscience in 1ndian Philosophy of Religion"， inRoy W. Perrett ed.: lndian 
Philoso戸hy01 Religioη(Kluwer Academic Publishers， Dordrecht， 1989)， pp.125-142. 
6 Peter Geach: Providence aηd Evil (Cambridge University Press， Cambridge， 197). 
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K vanvig，68 although the author's Asian sources for the time being are limited to the 
works translated into English. 
J ust a few words on the significance of a study of omniscience for present七-寸-
society. 
Modern society in the world， with its full-f1edged development and progress， 
including J apan， does not require anymore the existence of an omniscient being in any 
form. On the contrary， so-called modernity has evolved from the negation of an 
Absolute Being or God that claims Itself to be omniscient or omnipotent. Being 
secular， demystifying the sacred， excluding any pre-suppositions concerning the a11-
knowing or almighty， but rather， being agnostic and always holding a standpoint of 
evaluating things and matters with a notion that a1 values are subjective and relative， 
man disposes of cases， one by one， when necessary， realistically and scientifically. 
Keeping to this procedure， the present-day civilization of science and modernity has 
reached high achievements in the recent four hundred years since Rene Descartes. By 
so doing， we expect this procedure of modern scienticism to last forever; that although 
we have no omniscient being to rely upon， we may come to know everything at the end 
of this procedure. There is nothing left unknown by this process of scientific treatment. 
Thus， with this easy toying with progressive gnosticism， abandoning a dogmatic 
attitude， we come to assume another dogmatic attitude， that is， a unilateral propensity 
for simple scienticism. 
But now， on the eve of the twenty-first century， mankind could no longer expect 
much from scienticism. A simple faith in scientific progress could no longer generate 
such an optimism about the future of mankind as it hitherto succeeded in generating. 
Already we have lost sight of the Great God with a1 his mighty attributes. At the same 
time， with the end of the Cold War， we could no longer hold aloft the banner of 
ideology. Then， on what could we rely as our support， to order our values and goals? 
Losing the balance between the mind and the body， the mental and the physical， this 
troubled and alienated mankind is confronted with some recent upheavals of religious 
revivalism， that is， radical and fanatical fundamentalism in one area of the world or 
another， and an apocalyptic occultism， with its anti-social isolationism， out of despair， 
pushed it to the dangerous extreme of spewing a nerve-suffocating gas into the centre 
of Tokyo. 
We must proceed beyond the time-worn dichotomy between science and religion. 
Examining the characteristics of all-knowing ability that transcends the category of 
knowledge， we come to ponder deeply on the most fundamental aspect of human 
wisdom. What for， and how? 
67 Richard Swinburne: The Coherence 01 Theism， (Clarendon Press， Oxford， 1977). 
68 Jonathan L. Kvanvig: The Possibility 01 an All-Kηowing God， (Macmillan， London， 1986). 
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STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY No. 22 
The present speaker would like to close his speech with a famous phrase from 
Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika: 
“That which is longed for as the valid authority of knowledge 
is not the one who knows al indiscriminately; 
Rather， we wish to have the one who tels us 
the truth of properly discerning things to be forsaken， 
together with the means of relinquishment 
and things to be cultivated." 
/heyopadeya-tattvasya hany-upayasya vedakah/ 
/yah pramanam asav isto na tu sarvasya vedakah/ /69 
The Buddha is always perfect in his intention not to teach anything wrong or 
deceitful. He is perfect in his attainments of his own objectives as well as of those of 
other beings， that is， he remains always alert to the needs of al other living beings. 
That is his omniscience， the quality of his perfection in knowledge.70 
???
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69 Pramanavarttika， 1， 32 
70 Udaηavarga， 1， 2.
